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INTRODUCTION
The Open Educational Resources (“OER”) initiative has
inspired various institutions throughout the world to create and
maintain large repositories of digital teaching, learning, and
reference materials. As the size of these repositories increases, so
do the costs and administrative tasks associated with their
maintenance and servicing of multiple end-users accessing the
materials. To further the objectives and mission of the OER
movement, it is necessary to consider alternative sustainable
storage and distribution models available to participating and
interested universities from cloud providers. A cloud solution
provides several advantages to repositories, including
consolidation of available resources in a single location, increased
accessibility, and flexibility to the repository data centers. Not
only are these solutions cost effective for the repository, a cloud
solution may provide automation and self-service options which
effectively improve overall function and performance for end users
of OER materials. Importantly in the OER context, cloud
solutions may further encourage global resource-sharing and
collaboration, and improve the underlying quality and usefulness
of the resources. Cloud solutions are both innovative and
disruptive, but not without risk to the repository. Accordingly, it
is important to assess the protections and potential pitfalls
associated with a repository’s implementation of a cloud solution
for its educational resources.
This Article will summarize the content-related risks associated
with cloud hosting of educational content repositories, address how
existing law may provide protection to the repository and cloud
provider and what the parties must do to take full advantage of
such protections, set forth best practices to mitigate remaining risk,
and propose how that remaining risk should be contractually
allocated between the parties. Among other relevant contractual
terms, we will address traditional contract risk-allocation terms,
including representations and warranties, covenants, disclaimers,
limitations of liability, indemnification, and insurance. The
Article will focus on whether and how the fact of cloud storage and
distribution may increase the risk of liability to the repository and
what practices can be adopted to mitigate any increased risk. We
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will define how various available tools can be used to incentivize
the repository and cloud provider to each adopt policies,
procedures and practices, designed to minimize risks under
applicable law, and take advantage of protections already available
under current law to mitigate risk and provide each party with the
proper incentive to move forward with cloud sourcing for OER in
a manner that furthers the movement.
I. BACKGROUND
Cloud computing offers a business solution designed to cut
costs and provide operational agility. 1 Through this economic
model, shared resources, software, content, data, and other
information are provided to cloud customers (that is, repositories)
on demand in elastic quantities pursuant to a metered process. 2
Today, cloud-service solutions support operations in many
industries and are arguably well-suited for addressing business
needs faced by the education industry during a time of increasing
global connectedness and competitiveness amid growing
accessibility and digital-divide concerns. 3 As a cloud solution
necessarily involves some loss of control to the cloud user, any
increased legal and business risk associated with the solution will
vary to some degree based on the type of information to be cloud
sourced. 4 For example, regulated industries, such as financial
services and healthcare, face increased concerns around breach of
confidentiality, privacy, and security due to the sensitive and
regulated nature of the applicable content, and must carefully
allocate those risks and liabilities in any agreement with a cloud
1

See Lisa Angelo, Exploring Legal Issues at High Altitudes: The Law in the Cloud,
20 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 39, 41–42 (2011).
2
See id. at 40.
3
See Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr., Ethical Obligations for Attorneys Using Cloud
Computing/Software As a Service While Fulfilling the Duties of Confidentiality and
Preservation of Client Property, 34-JUN PA. LAW 49, 55 (2012); Charles M. Horn &
Chris Ford, Are Financial Institutions Ready for Cloud Computing?, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/are-financialinstitutions-ready-for-cloud-computing.
4
See Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes & Masooda N. Bashir, Information Privacy and
Data Control in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market
Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 363–64 (2013).
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provider.5 For institutions with educational content repositories,
the more significant risks relate to digital rights management and
potential liability for intellectual property infringement and
content-based tort claims, such as defamation and false-light
privacy, and regulation of obscenity, indecency, and other
actionable speech.6
As will be discussed below, there are several legal concepts
and related tools available to the repository and cloud provider to
mitigate many of these content-based legal risks. As each concept
is discussed, we will propose best practices and compliance
requirements necessary to take advantage of the full protections
afforded by such laws, and suggest how the contractual riskallocation might be best structured to ensure that each party has a
responsibility to help mitigate risk associated with the solution.
Best practices will include suggestions for disclaimers, notices,
licensing models, contractual provisions, and technical tools. We
will discuss the respective roles and responsibilities of the
institution seeking to outsource its repository and the cloud
provider, how the legal concepts provide protection to each,
identify gaps, and discuss how certain acts by either party could
void or compromise protections available under current law.
When parties have equal bargaining power, these risk allocation
provisions are most effectively used to place liability on the party
in the best position to mitigate the related risk.
While the other risk-related contract provisions play a role,
ultimately parties to a contract rely on indemnification to allocate
and manage risk. To indemnify another party is to compensate
that party for loss or damage that has already occurred, or to
guarantee through a contractual agreement to repay another party
for loss or damage that occurs in the future. 7 Indemnification
clauses will often include an obligation to defend, requiring the
indemnifying party to assume the defense of the claim. 8
5

See J. Nicholas Hoover, Compliance in the Ether: Cloud Computing, Data Security
and Business Regulation, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255, 256–57 (2013).
6
See discussion infra Parts II, III.
7
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (9th ed. 2009).
8
See Thomas MS Hemnes, Intellectual Property Indemnity Clauses 2013 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 22 (2013).
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Depending on the complexity of the indemnification provision, the
indemnified party may have the right to participate in the defense
at its own expense. 9 A thoughtful indemnification provision
should specifically address and allocate the identified and agreed
risk associated with the specific business arrangement and avoid
imposing risks that are unclear, shared, or relatively minor.
As a starting point for defining contractual risk allocation, it is
important to consider the current business model and related risk,
how that risk changes by moving to the cloud, how each party
benefits from the commercial arrangement, and which party is in
the best position to mitigate the key risks. 10 With respect to
current risk, OER repositories may be open or closed, yet there is
little doubt that the repository bears the content-related risks
associated with its proprietary hosting of the content.11 In open
systems, the university allows users of OER materials outside the
immediate community to access, use, and publish information,
whereas a closed system allows only members of the university
community to engage in those activities. With a closed system,
there is arguably less anonymity, possibly resulting in a greater
sense of control over the end-user base on the back-end and a
greater degree of buy-in from users of OER materials on the frontend.
The application of privacy policies and terms-of-use
documents is common practice and considered to constitute best
practices for online services, including institutions with OER
repositories.12 The posted privacy policy advises the end user as
to how the repository may collect, use, share, and store the data it
receives from the end user through the user’s input of data and its
use of the service, as well as how the end user may access and
9

See id.
See Consolidated Audit Trail Rule, SEC Comments on Proposed Rule No. 3462174, 2010 WL 3492680 (proposed on Aug. 9, 2010).
11
See CTR. FOR EDUC. RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, GIVING KNOWLEDGE FOR FREE:
THE EMERGENCE OF OPEN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 115–16 (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/edu/ceri/38654317.pdf.
12
See Hoover, supra note 5, at 271. See generally AMERICAN UNIVERSITY CENTER
FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, CODE FOR BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR OPENCOURSEWARE (Oct.
2009), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/10-305-OCW-Oct29.
pdf.
10
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update certain data. 13
The repository’s posted terms and
conditions inform users of OER materials of the purpose of the
service, how it may be used, identify limitations and restrictions
applicable to the service, define certain procedural remedies for
suspected infringement, and establish the end user’s
responsibilities in connection with such use.14 In order to be part
of an effective risk-management strategy, these documents should
be customized by the interactive service provider (that is, the
repository) to fit the specific circumstances and provide
meaningful disclosure to the end user. Whether or not these
documents are effective tools to shift major risks to individual endusers remains open for discussion with respect to enforceability
and practical utility, but at a minimum, they can serve the valuable
purpose of disclosure when written and posted effectively.
Understanding and categorizing the types of content included
in a given repository is an important first step in the risk-analysis
process. Examples of different content types that impact related
risk from a copyright perspective include materials owned by the
institution, materials contributed from members of the university
community, and materials contributed by members outside the
community.15 Arguably, as control over the materials diminishes
across the groups, the risk of copyright-infringement liability
increases. In an effort to address copyright concerns, many of the
major OER repositories are encouraging end users to create and
publish works to repositories under the Creative Commons
authorization model.16
13
See Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, and Masooda N. Bashir, Cloud Services,
Contract Terms, and Legal Rights, 17 J. INTERNET L. 3, 8 (2013).
14
See id.
15
See CTR. FOR EDUC. RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 46.
16
See generally AMERICAN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 12, at
1. The Creative Commons license is based on copyright and generally applicable to
works that are protected by Copyright law, although it was designed for use with content
assets, not software assets. There are multiple versions of the license available for use
by an author, but the least restrictive and most favored from an OER perspective is the
ShareAlike version, which is somewhat analogous to the GNU General Public License
for open-source software. All Creative Commons licenses allow others to copy,
distribute, and make some uses of their work, and ensure that authors can be credited for
their work. Additional permissions may be granted to specifically allow commercial
use, creation of a derivative work and/or require republication of the derivative work.
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As to how existing risk to the repository changes with the
implementation of a cloud solution, certainly there is risk inherent
in the greater public access, visibility and utilization of repository
content.17 However, this risk alone should not justify an arbitrary
shift of liability. Further, relationships between a repository and
cloud provider may differ in many important respects, each of
which may suggest a different allocation of risk and disclosurebased tools to support the agreed allocation. 18 Given that
contractual risk arguably represents another form of compensation
paid by one party to another, it is important to understand the
economic benefits derived by each party in connection with the
particular relationship. Ultimately, this requires an understanding
of each party’s respective role and opportunity.
As will be discussed below, the availability of certain
protective legal tools and doctrines will depend on each party’s
role, responsibilities, and rights under the contract. Specifically, it
is important to understand and define whether each party plays a
passive or active role in the creation of the available repository
content, and perhaps to differentiate such role from the party’s role
in the collecting, storing, and providing that content through the
hosted platform. It is our opinion that the protections offered to
an “interactive service provider” under the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”) far outweigh the potential liability,
provided that the “interactive service provider” does not originate
or add to the material on the web. Furthermore, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA’) provides temporary
immunity to what it calls “internet service providers” 19 from
By requiring users to publish under this architecture, repository users will have a
common understanding of the rights granted in the database, and use of the built-in
software tagging feature that provides some limited digital rights management
functionality. While use of the Creative Commons license provides a clear path for
works that are entirely original to the author, there is still risk associated with any preexisting works included in published content and other circumstances where the author
simply does not have the rights necessary to license the work. See About The Licenses,
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
17
See Hoover, supra note 5, at 261.
18
Id. at 258.
19
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (the DMCA calls the service an “internet
service provider”). The services in the CDA and the DMCA are basically the same.
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liability for copyright infringement until the service or its agent
receives notice from the copyright holder or its representative,
provided that the sample is not so egregiously known that it is clear
that it infringes.20 In addition, a recent “fair use” case has held
that digital works are a different market from a traditional paper
work because of the searching and “text mining” capabilities, and,
therefore, are free from infringement under the “fair use”
doctrine.21
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (CDA)
A. Immunity for Third-party Postings
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was added to the
law in 1996, 22 largely in response to Stratton Oakmont Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co.,23 in which an “interactive service provider”
was held liable for material that was posted on the service by a
third party because the provider “monitored” the content on the
site.24 The CDA eliminated the liability for state law causes of
action for content that was posted by third parties. The CDA has
a number of provisions, including section 230(c)(1) which
provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”25
There is also section 230(c)(2) which provides that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of –
any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
20

See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27–28 (2d Cir. 2012)
[hereinafter YouTube II].
21
See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
22
Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
23
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 94-CV-31063, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
24
Id. The monitoring was meant to prevent offensive, obscene, indecent, or
infringing material from being on the Internet.
25
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
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lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).26
Section 230(f)(2) further provides that the term
[I]nteractive computer service [means] any
information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access
to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.27
And finally, section 230(f)(3) provides that the term
“information content provider” means “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.”28
The first case to test the CDA was Zeran v. America Online,
Inc.29 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the proposition that AOL was
a “provider” and not a “publisher,” and restated the ideology of the
CDA:
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based
lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and
burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of
tort liability on service providers for the
communications of others represented, for
Congress, simply another form of intrusive
government regulation of speech. [Section] 230
26

Id. § 230(c)(2).
Id. § 230(f)(2).
28
Id. § 230(f)(3).
29
958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied., 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
27
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was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature
of Internet communications and, accordingly, to
keep government interference in the medium to a
minimum.30
The CDA has been upheld again and again to immunize
“interactive service providers” from material that has been posted
by third parties.31
The CDA was given its broadest and most expansive
interpretation by the California Supreme Court in Barrett v.
Rosenthal. 32 In that case, the California Supreme Court made
several important observations regarding the statutory language of
the CDA.33
Rosenthal was a party who redistributed allegedly defamatory
posts on a website, even after receiving notice that the messages
might be defamatory.34 The Court recognized that Rosenthal is
not a “service provider,” but a “user” of Internet services.35 The
case appears to be “the first published case in which section 230
immunity has been invoked by an individual who had no
supervisory role in the operation of the Internet site where the
defamatory material appeared. Rosenthal was also clearly not an
‘internet service provider’ under the broad definition provided in
the CDA.”36 The California Court was faced with the question of
whether there was any difference under the CDA between active

30

Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
524 U.S. 937 (1998). Congress made the legislative choice to treat Internet publishers
differently from corresponding publishers in print, television, and radio for two primary
reasons, the first being “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free
speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
31
See, e.g., Black v. Google, Inc., 457 Fed. Appx. 622 (9th Cir. 2011); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816
(2002); Barrett v. Fonorow, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1184, (2d Dist. 2003); Barrett v. Rosenthal,
146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
32
146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
33
See id. at 526–29.
34
See id. at 513.
35
See id.
36
Id. at 514.
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and passive users.37 The court looked at the statutory language of
the Act and determined that “Congress employed the term ‘user’ to
refer simply to anyone using an interactive computer service
without distinguishing between active and passive use.” 38
Therefore, sending an allegedly defamatory remark to others
unchanged39 would also be fully immunized under the CDA. The
Court first recognized that “distributor” liability would have a
dramatic chilling effect on Internet service providers, and that
Congress did not intend to create such an exception to section 230
immunity.40
We share the concerns of those who have expressed
reservations about the Zeran court’s broad interpretation of section
230 immunity. The prospect of blanket immunity for those who
intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet has
disturbing implications. Nevertheless, by its terms, section 230
exempts Internet intermediaries from defamation liability for
republication. The statutory immunity serves to protect online
freedom of expression and to encourage self-regulation, as
Congress intended. Section 230 has been interpreted literally. It
does not permit Internet service providers or users to be sued as
“distributors,” nor does it expose “active users” to liability.41
The only remedy that was left for the plaintiffs was “pursuing
the originator of the allegedly defamatory publications.”42 With
respect to contributions posted on the repository site by third
parties (that is, individual end-users), it would appear that both the
repository and cloud provider would be interactive service
providers eligible for immunity from liability for defamation
arising out of third-party postings in the repository provided that it
does not create or add to the posting by a third party. For clarity,
this immunity would not be available to the educational institution
37

See id. at 513 (“We further hold that section 230(c)(1) immunizes individual ‘users’
of interactive computer services, and that no practical or principled distinction can be
drawn between active and passive use.”).
38
Id. at 515.
39
As we shall see later, there are questions of CDA immunity when the service or a
user adds editorial comment to the message.
40
See Rosenthal, 146 P.3d at 529.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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with respect to content provided by the institution to the repository,
but would still be available to the cloud provider.43
B. Liability Under the CDA for Being in Whole or in Part a
“Content” Provider
Those few cases in which there has been liability under the
CDA—and there are only a few—involved cases in which the
“interactive service provider” crossed the line and was involved in
creating content, as well as merely hosting content.44 In Fraley v.
Facebook, Inc., members of the social network website with
hundreds of millions of users worldwide filed suit against the
owner of the website alleging that its advertising practice of
placing members’ names, pictures, and assertions that they “liked”
certain advertisers of other members’ pages constituted, inter alia,
a violation of California’s Right of Publicity Statute, California’s
Unfair Competition Law, and the common law of unjust
enrichment. 45 The CDA, which provides broad immunity to
websites that publish content provided by third parties, did not bar
the claim against Facebook for misappropriation based on
Facebook’s unauthorized use of the members’ photographs and
names for advertising purposes.46
Because Facebook was both an “interactive computer service”
and an “information content provider,” it was ineligible for
complete immunity under the CDA.47 While it provided computer
access to millions of users to its service, Facebook went beyond its
traditional function when it took members’ names, photographs,
and likenesses without their consent and used the information to
create new content that it published as endorsements of third-party
products and/or services. 48 Thus, although the CDA provides
broad immunity to websites that publish content provided by third
parties, a website operator can lose its statutory immunity if it

43
44
45
46
47
48

See id.
See cases cited supra note 30.
830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
See id. at 800.
See id. at 801.
See id.
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creates, or is responsible, in whole or in part, for creating new
content that it provides to the users.49
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, L.L.C.,50 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held
that the CDA did not provide immunity from state law causes of
action because the defendants, “required subscribers to the site as
prospective landlords or tenants to include information that was
illegal under the Fair Housing Act.”51 For example, those posting
to the site “had to fill out a questionnaire indicating racial, gender,
family-status and sexual-orientation preferences for the apartments
they wished to rent or rent out.”52 The Ninth Circuit held that by
imposing this requirement, “Roommate [sic] becomes much more
than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it
becomes the developer, at least in part of that information.” 53
Immunity was also denied in Federal Trade Comm’n v.
Accusearch, Inc.,54 where the site sold various personal data, also
violating federal law.55
In Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, L.L.C., the
plaintiff, a school-teacher and a cheerleader for the Cincinnati
Bengals, asserted defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress causes of action against the owner
and operator of a website named “thedirty.com” for (1)
encouraging the posting of offensive material; (2) commenting on
the offensive material itself; and (3) promising to remove, but not

49

See id.
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
51
Id. at 1165. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 makes it illegal:
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation,
or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
52
Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d at 1165–66.
53
Id. at 1166.
54
570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
55
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
50
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removing, the offensive material. 56 Upon learning of the post,
plaintiff emailed the website and requested that the post be
removed because she was concerned that it could affect her job.57
After initially receiving a response stating that the website would
remove the post, plaintiff was told that the post would not be
removed. 58 The second post had made allegations that the
plaintiff had venereal diseases. 59 The defendant had written
comments about the postings themselves and placed them on his
site.60 Plaintiff again requested that the site take down the posts.61
Her requests were ignored, and the plaintiff subsequently filed
suit.62
The court held that the defendant “edits” the site and selects a
small percentage of submissions for publication. 63
More
importantly, the defendant adds his own comments and opinions as
to what he thinks of the various postings on the site.64 Based upon
“the name of the site, the manner in which the site was managed,
the personal comments of defendant [ . . .], the defendants have
specifically encouraged the development of what is offensive about
the content of the site.”65
As the above cases indicate, if third parties provide content,
there is no liability for merely being an “interactive service
provider.” This is true, it would appear, even if the service is
made aware of something containing content that would violate
state law such as defamation, the right of publicity, and the rights
of privacy. However, should the repository or cloud promise to
remove something, and not follow through, liability under a
contract theory may attach.66 It is important to carefully consider
56

See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009
(E.D. Ky. 2012).
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id. at 1012.
64
See id.
65
Id.
66
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (Although the
CDA eliminated all claims related to Yahoo! being a publisher, a contract claim based on
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this risk when drafting the terms of use and privacy policy for the
repository.
Although there have not been any reported CDA cases dealing
with the “text searching” capability, there has been one reported
case67 in which the scanning of entire texts and giving them digital
text searching capability has been held to be a “fair use,” and,
therefore, not an infringement of copyright.68 It is doubtful that
merely providing text-searching capability would cause one to rise
to the level of an “information content provider.”69 We believe
that far more would be required before the service meets the
requirement of “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”70
If correct, this should provide some comfort to the cloud provider
in its role of aggregating repository content and facilitating search
across repositories.
In conclusion, the CDA provides beneficial protection for both
the repository and cloud provider in each party’s role as an
interactive service provider. The institution should carefully
select the content contributed by it to the repository and
contractually retain responsibility for state law claims arising in
connection with such institution’s content in its agreement with the
cloud provider. Given the broad immunity provided under the
CDA, neither party should be obligated to indemnify the other for
content-related liability under state claims arising in connection
with the third-party postings, except to the extent its actions render
it an information content provider with respect to the content
giving rise to the liability. As noted earlier, the repository owner
Oregon law’s “promissory estoppel” theory was allowed to proceed: “[I]nsofar as Barnes
alleges a breach of contract claim under the theory of promissory estoppel, subsection
230(c)(1) does not preclude her cause of action. Because we have only reviewed the
affirmative defense that Yahoo! raised in this appeal, we do not reach the question
whether Barnes has a viable contract claim or whether Yahoo! has an affirmative defense
under subsection 230(c)(2) of the Act.”).
67
See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also
discussion infra Part IV.D.
68
See Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
69
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012).
70
See id.
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should post thoughtful terms of use intended to minimize misuse of
the service by users, and require each user to affirmatively agree to
comply with those terms in connection with its use of the site.
The repository owner’s practical exposure to claims for which its
users are ultimately responsible will exist whether it hosts the
content on its servers or through a cloud provider. This risk
should be managed by the repository with quality control tools at
the front-end. Such tools may limit publication rights to a
restricted population (i.e., a closed community), require
publication pursuant to a Creative Commons license, and include
recordkeeping features to track publications by user.
III. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA)
Just as the CDA was passed in response to the decision in a
case, so, too, was the DMCA.71 The DMCA was passed in direct
response to Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online
Communications Services, Inc. in which the company that merely
provided the connection to the Internet was held to be potentially
liable, and not merely a conduit.72 Several years before Netcom,
two Bulletin Board Services (“BBS”) were held liable for
copyright infringement for uploads and downloads of files by their
subscribers in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena 73 and Sega
Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA.74
As part of the DMCA, Congress passed the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), now codified in
Section 512 of the Copyright Act. 75 An “Internet Service
71

See Sean Croman, Where the Netcom Yardstick Comes up Short: Courts Should Not
Apply the Facts of Netcom as an Example of Intermediate and Transient Storage Under S
512(a) of the DMCA, 80 WASH. L. REV. 417, 417 (2005); see also Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18,
2013) [hereinafter Youtube I] (The CDA provides absolute immunity to “interactive
service providers” from state law claims for material posted by third parties; the DMCA
provides limited immunity for “internet service providers” for copyright infringement
until the ISP has received proper notice from the copyright holder).
72
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Commc’ns Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Croman, supra note 71, at 417.
73
See 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
74
See 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
75
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
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Provider” will not be liable for infringement for (1) transitory
digital network communications; 76 (2) system caching; 77 (3)
information residing on systems at the direction of users;78 and (4)
information location tools79.
For our purposes, we are mainly concerned with section
512(c), information residing on systems at the direction of users.
Section 512(c) contains the “notice and takedown” provisions,
providing that an Internet service provider cannot be liable until it
has been put on notice of the alleged infringement. 80 Once on
notice, if the Internet service provider “responds expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity” it will not be
liable. 81 In order to be eligible for invoking the safe harbor
protections, an ISP must meet the conditions set forth under
section 512(i).82 The Internet service provider must show that it:
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and
informs subscribers and account holders of the
service provider’s system or network of, a policy
that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of
the service provider’s system or network who are
repeat infringers;83 and
76

Id. § 512(a).
Id. § 512(b).
78
Id. § 512(c).
79
Id. § 512(d).
80
The safe harbor provision of the DMCA states that a “service provider shall not be
liable for monetary relief” if all of the following requirements are met:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material on its
network is infringing;
(ii) . . . it is not aware of facts or circumstances that would make the
infringing activity apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of such infringing
activity, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access . . . the
[copyrighted] material . . . .
Id. § 512(c).
81
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
82
See id. § 512(i).
83
An example of notification from the MITx terms of service:
If you expect copyright infringement has occurred at MIT, pursuant
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, electronic notifications
77
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(B) accommodates and does not interfere with
standard technical measures.84
Most of section 512(c) of the DMCA is relatively
straightforward. There is no liability until either the service
provider or its agent receives notice. 85 What is not so clear is
what happens when content that was put on the service by a third
party is so egregiously infringing that a party should have known
that it infringes, and should take it down. Must the service
provider wait for a notice of infringement, or must the service
provider take it down anyway? A brief discussion of the Second
Circuit’s decision in Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.86 and the
about the unauthorized online use of copyrighted materials should be
sent by email to dmca-agent@mit.edu.
If you do not include an electronic signature with your claim, you
may be asked to send or fax a follow-up copy with a signature. To
file the notification, you must be either the copyright owner of the
work or an individual authorized to act on behalf of the copyright
owner.
Notification must include:
Identification of the copyrighted work, or, in the case of multiple
works at the same location, a representative list of such works at that
site.
Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity. You must include sufficient
information for us to locate the material (e.g., url, ip address,
computer name).
Information for us to be able to contact the complaining party (e.g.,
email address, phone number).
A statement that the complaining party believes that the use of the
material has not been authorized by the copyright owner or an
authorized agent.
A statement that the information in the notification is accurate and
that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the
copyright owner.
DMCA Notifications, COPYRIGHT AT MIT, http://web.mit.edu/copyright/dmcanotices/html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
84
17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
85
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718 F.3d 1006, 1026
(9th Cir. 2013); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1105 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010); Rossi
v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004); Xcentric
Ventures L.L.C. v. Mediolex, Ltd., No. 12-CV-00130 (PHX) (GMS), 2012 WL 5269403,
at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2012); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d
724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Capital Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d
627, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
86
676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
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decision of the Southern District of New York’s on remand87 are
warranted.
The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court’s initial
holding that “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or
circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of
infringement will disqualify an interactive service provider from
the safe harbor,” but they disagreed with the District Court over
whether or not YouTube had “specific knowledge or awareness.”88
On appeal in the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the
record raised material issues of fact regarding YouTube’s actual
knowledge or “red flag” awareness of specific instances of
infringement. 89 To that end, the plaintiffs pointed out various
estimates regarding the percentage of infringing content on the
YouTube Web site:
For example, Viacom cite[d] evidence that
YouTube employees conducted Web site surveys
and estimated that 75–80% of all YouTube streams
contained copyrighted material. The plaintiffs
similarly claimed that Credit Suisse, acting as
financial advisor to Google, estimated that more
than 60% of YouTube’s content was ‘premium’
copyrighted content—and that only 10% of the
premium content was authorized.90
These percentages suggest that YouTube was conscious of the
fact a significant amount of material on its website was infringing.
Beyond the survey results, the plaintiffs reli[ed]
upon internal YouTube communications that do
refer to particular clips or groups of clips. The . . .
plaintiffs argue[d] that YouTube was aware of
specific infringing material because, inter alia,
YouTube attempted to search for specific Premier
League videos on the site in order to gauge their
87

Viacom Int’l, Inc v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013).
88
See YouTube II, 676 F.3d at 33.
89
See id. at 30–31.
90
See id. at 32–33.
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“value based on video usage.” In particular, the
class plaintiffs cited a February 7, 2007 e-mail from
Patrick Walker, director of video partnerships for
Google and YouTube, requesting that his colleagues
calculate the number of daily searches for the terms
“soccer,” “football,” and “Premier League” in
preparation for a bid on the global rights to Premier
League content. On another occasion, Walker
requested that any “clearly infringing, official
broadcast footage” from a list of top Premier
League clubs—including Liverpool Football Club,
Chelsea Football Club, Manchester United Football
Club, and Arsenal Football Club—be taken down in
advance of a meeting with the heads of “several
major sports teams and leagues.”
YouTube
ultimately decided not to make a bid for the Premier
League rights, but the infringing content allegedly
remained on the Web site.91
The record in the [YouTube] action includes additional
examples.92 YouTube founder Jawed Karim prepared a report in
March 2006 which stated that “[a]s of today[,] episodes and clips
of the following well-known shows can still be found [on
YouTube]: Family Guy, South Park, MTV Cribs, Daily Show,
Reno 911, [and] Dave Chapelle [sic].” Karim further opined that
“although YouTube is not legally required to monitor content . . . .
and complies with DMCA takedown requests, we would benefit
from preemptively removing content that is blatantly illegal and
likely to attract criticism.”93 He also noted that “a more thorough
analysis” of the issue would be required.94
Several of the shows to which Karim referred are owned by
Viacom:
[I]n a July 4, 2005 e-mail exchange, YouTube
founder Chad Hurley sent an e-mail to his cofounders with the subject line “budlight
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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commercials,” and stated, “we need to reject these
too.” Steve Chen responded, “can we please leave
these in a bit longer? another week or two can’t
hurt.” Karim also replied, indicating that he “added
back in all 28 bud videos.” Similarly, in an August
9, 2005 e-mail exchange, Hurley urged his
colleagues “to start being diligent about rejecting
copyrighted / inappropriate content,” noting that
“there is a cnn [sic] clip of the shuttle clip on the
site today, if the boys from Turner would come to
the site, they might be pissed?” Again, Chen
resisted:
But we should just keep that stuff on the site. I
really don’t see what will happen. what? [sic]
someone from cnn sees it? he happens to be
someone with power? he happens to want to take it
down right away. he gets in touch with cnn legal. 2
weeks later, we get a cease & desist letter. we take
the video down.
And again, Karim agreed, indicating that “the CNN
space shuttle clip, I like. We [sic] can remove it
once we’re bigger and better known, but for now
that clip is fine.”95
The Second Circuit was convinced that the plaintiffs:
[M]ay have raised a material issue of fact regarding
YouTube’s knowledge or awareness of specific
instances of infringement . . . . On these facts, a
reasonable juror could conclude that YouTube had
actual knowledge of specific infringing activity, or
was at least aware of facts or circumstances from
which specific infringing activity was apparent.96
The appellate court continued, “Accordingly, we hold that
summary judgment to YouTube on all clips-in-suit, especially in
the absence of any detailed examination of the extensive record on

95
96

Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
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summary judgment, was premature.” 97 On the issue of willful
blindness, the court stated, a person is “willfully blind” or engages
in “conscious avoidance” amounting to knowledge where the
person “‘was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and
consciously avoided confirming that fact.’”98 The Second Circuit
remanded the case to the Southern District of New York.99
On remand, the Southern District of New York granted
YouTube’s motion for summary judgment again. 100 Despite the
findings of the Second Circuit, the Southern District held in favor
of YouTube. 101 The court held that Congress had placed the
burden squarely on the copyright holder or his agent(s) to identify
infringements, and that Viacom had specifically not done so. 102
“YouTube submitted a list of 63,000 clips-in-suit, claimed it never
received adequate notices of any of those infringements, and
challenged plaintiffs to fill in the blanks specifying how they claim
such notices was given.” 103 Viacom admitted that they were
“unable to say which clips-in-suit [YouTube] knew about and
which they did not . . . .”104
The District Court found that “site traffic on YouTube had
soared to more than 1 billion daily traffic views, with more than 24
97

Id.
Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993))
(citing United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)).
99
See id. at 41–42.
100
See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (LLS) 2013 WL 1689071,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013).
101
See id. at *11.
102
See id. at *2. As stated in the Senate Report at pp. 46–47, and the House Report at
55–56:
Subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) requires that the copyright owner or its
authorized agent provide the service provider with information
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to identify and
locate the allegedly infringing material. An example of such
sufficient information would be a copy or description of the
allegedly infringing material and the URL address of the location
(web page) which is alleged to contain the infringing material. The
goal of this provision is to provide the service provider with adequate
information to find and address the allegedly infringing material
expeditiously.
Id.
103
Id. at *1.
104
Id.
98
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hours of new video uploaded to the site every minute, and the
natural consequence that no service provider could possibly be
aware of the contents of each such video.”105 YouTube was not
liable for not removing material without receiving adequate
notice.106
Regarding the notice provision, the court held that “[t]he
system is entirely workable; In 2007 Viacom itself gave such
notice to YouTube of infringements by some 100,000 videos,
which were taken down by YouTube by the next business day.”107
The court continued, “Congress has determined that the burden of
identifying what must be taken down is to be on the copyright
owner, a determination which has proven practicable in
practice.”108
Viacom lacked proof that YouTube had knowledge that the
clips-in-suit infringed. 109 Therefore, under the DMCA safe
harbor, YouTube was not liable. 110 The court looked at other
theories of liability, such as “willful blindness” 111 or “right and
ability to control,” 112 and also refused to hold YouTube liable
under those theories. Summary judgment was granted in favor of
YouTube.113
In virtually every case, if the defendant had the notice
provisions in place, and if plaintiff(s) complied with the notice
provisions, there was no liability if the defendant took the
offending material down. It should be noted that there was one
recent case in which the “safe harbor” did not apply. In Columbia
Picture Industries, Inc. v. Fung, the defendant was liable under
inducement of infringement for encouraging end users to upload
and download copyrighted motion pictures through the use of a
hybrid peer-to-peer file sharing protocol.114
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
See id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
See id. at *11.
See Columbia Picture Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013).
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In the case of a cloud provider and repository, an important
issue is the proper party for receiving the notices. Assuming the
cloud provider aggregates access across multiple repositories
through a common search or other function, there is a possibility
that people will respond to the cloud provider as the gatekeeper on
the frontend. Further assuming that this search feature will deliver
the user to the branded repository site, the cloud provider’s role
may be more obviously limited. In any event, best practice would
suggest that the cloud provider include some type of conspicuous
disclaimer on its search page effectively notifying users that the
underlying content is provided by the applicable repository and
that any user communications should be properly directed to the
applicable repository owner. Additionally, a process has to be put
in place for cloud provider to notify the repository owner quickly
and expeditiously if it nonetheless receives any DMCA notices so
the repository owner can decide whether or not the material is
infringing.
Again, the institution should contractually retain responsibility
for copyright claims arising in connection with repository content
posted by the institution as a user in its agreement with the cloud
provider. Neither party should be obligated to indemnify the other
for copyright liability associated with content posted by third-party
users in the repository, except to the extent it breaches specific
contractual obligations with respect to the handling of copyright
infringement claims. In the contract, the repository owner should
assume overall DMCA compliance responsibility, with an
obligation to post and follow compliant DMCA notice and
takedown provisions on its site. However, best practice would
suggest that the cloud provider contractually agree to include
effective notice to users on its site about this responsibility and
follow mutually agreed notice procedures to forward any
misdirected DMCA notices it does receive to the appropriate party.
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IV. FAIR USE
A. Background
During the major “overhaul” of the U.S. copyright statutes that
ultimately resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress decided
to expressly include fair-use provisions in the federal copyright
statutes.115 In many, if not most, situations at both the federal and
state levels in which a common-law doctrine is codified, the
legislature acts with a degree of specificity to create more certainty
and guidance in the law.116 One would have thought, therefore,
that by codifying the fair-use doctrine, the U.S. Congress wanted
to do the same. The legislative history of section 107, however,
indicates just the contrary. Congress decided to add “fair use” to
the new Act in a way that would maintain the status quo:
While the statutory language provides some
guidance as to the types of factors to consider, the
factors are not exhaustive. There are no consistent
rules regarding how much weight to give any factor.
The language in Section 107 provides judges who
interpret the law plenty of “wiggle room” to
essentially arrive at almost any decision in any
case.117
Moreover, as in any exercise of linguistic interpretation,
especially one that deals with a concept so nebulous and illusory as
“fairness,” judges will inevitably bring their own values and
ideologies into their analyses, consciously or unconsciously. After
approximately 45 years of judicial case-by-case interpretation of
the fair use provisions in the U.S. Code, there is far too much
uncertainty with respect to which uses will be considered to be
“fair” and which will infringe.118
115

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
See Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale L.S. Faculty Scholarship Series at 18 (1954).
117
See H. R. REP. NO. 84-1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 65-66 (1976).
118
Michael Landau, “Fair Use” Under U.S. Copyright Law 2 (IPRinfo Special Issue,
Sept. 2006).
It is also interesting to note that although the United States is a
member of the Berne Convention and also a signatory to the TRIPS
Agreement and WIPO Copyright Treaty, there is never any mention
116
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Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use as reproductions in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work is fair use the following
factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.

anything that even remotely resembles the “three-step test” in United
States “fair use” cases or the Copyright Act of 1976.
Id.
In a nutshell, the three-step test “sets limits to limitations on exclusive rights” and allows
limitations: (a) in certain special cases; (b) that do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work; and (c) that do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author/right-holder. Today, the three-step test appears not only in the
Berne Convention but also in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Moreover, several European Directives
contain the test. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
art. 9(2), July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1979);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), art. 10, Dec 20, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc No. 105-17 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S 121; WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, art. 16, S. Treaty Doc No. 105-17 (1997), WPPT 2186 U.N.T.S. 203; see also M.
Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test—An Analysis of the ThreeStep Test in International and EC Copyright Law 4 (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague (2004)).
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The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all of the above factors.119
B. Transformative Use Analysis
In recent years, however, “transformative use,” a doctrine that
is not mentioned at all in the statute, has entered into and has, in
fact, dominated the analysis of the first factor, if not the entire fairuse analysis. 120 “Transformative Use” was advocated in a law
review article penned by Judge Pierre Leval, Toward Developing A
Fair Use Standard. 121 Judge Leval believed that if one uses
another’s copyrighted material in a way that is sufficiently
“transformative” so that the resultant new work serves a different
purpose from that of the original, and does not supplant the
demand for the original, the use should likely be fair. 122 The
creator of the new work is serving one of the purposes of copyright
law, “ . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts.”123
The “transformative use” doctrine was cited with approval by
the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, a case involving the
119

17 U.S.C. § 107. The last sentence of section 107 was added in 1992, largely in
response to Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) and its
progeny.
120
See Pierre Leval, Toward Developing a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990).
121
See id.
122
See id. Much of the logic in Judge Leval’s article is influenced by Justice Story’s
1841 Folsom v. Marsh decision. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841). It is important to note, however, that at the time that Folsom was decided in
1841, the exclusive rights were limited to the rights of “printing, publishing, selling or
disposing.” Id. at 349. There was no exclusive right to prepare “derivative works,” such
as adaptations or translations. For example, in Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853), the German translation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s famous novel,
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, was held to not infringe because it was not a “copy” or
“reproduction” of the original work. The statutory rights are different today. Section
106(2) of the 1976 Act grants copyright holders the exclusive right “to prepare derivative
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). A “derivative work” is defined in section 101 as “a work
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted.” Id. §101.
123
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

654

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:627

issue of whether 2 Live Crew’s parody of the Roy Orbison song,
“Pretty Woman” was a fair use. 124 Although the case was
reversed and remanded based upon legal error and never decided
fully on the merits by the Supreme Court, the opinion does contain
the language, “the more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of the other factors, like commercialism, that
may weigh against a finding of fair use.”125 Since the Acuff-Rose
decision, every defendant in a copyright infringement case now
chants the mantra of “transformative use” in an attempt to
convince a court that its appropriation of copyrighted material
should be “fair use.”126
This trend has been gaining momentum in recent years. In
fact, if one looks at the modern fair use cases, “transformative use”
appears to be the only major factor, with one factor regarding the
market to be a minor factor.127 In reality, in a transformative use
case, the “fair use” factors are really only these two:
1) Is the use “transformative.” (Has the second user
added some function, purpose, or even just other
material?); and
2) Does the use supplant or usurp the market for
the original.128
We will now address a few recent relevant “fair use” cases that
may have an impact on the cloud, notwithstanding the CDA or the
DMCA.
Transformative use has played a major part in recent parody
cases.129 In SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Eleventh
124

510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 569.
126
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998).
127
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 597 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 715 (2011).
128
The AU Center for Social Media has phrased it slightly differently: “(1) Is the re-use
‘transformative’—that is, does it add value to and repurpose preexisting material for a
new audience meaning has it been put to a new use or purpose from the original work?
(2) Is the amount of material taken appropriate to the re-use?” AU Center for Social
Media, Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for OpenCourseWare, available at
centerforsocialmedia.org/ocw.
125
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Circuit held that a The Wind Done Gone, parody of the famous
Civil War novel, Gone With the Wind, was sufficiently
“transformative” to be a fair use, despite acknowledging that the
defendant appropriated substantial copyrighted portions of the
book.130 No harm to the potential market was found because the
estate of Margaret Mitchell would never agree at any time to
license rights to make a sequel to Gone with the Wind that is told
from the vantage point of an African-American slave who was the
half-sister of Scarlet O’Hara and in which the character of Ashley
Wilkes was gay.131
In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Second Circuit
held that an advertising photograph showing the body of a
pregnant woman and the face of male actor Leslie Nielsen, was a
“transformative use” of photographer Annie Leibovitz’s
copyrighted photograph of a pregnant actress Demi Moore.132 In
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., a series of photographs
entitled “Food Chain Barbie,” that depicted an often nude Barbie
Doll posed in various positions while being attacked by vintage
household appliances was sufficiently “transformative” because it
parodied the character Barbie and did not supplant the demand for
the original doll.133
“Transformative use” does not only apply to parody. A use
may be classified as “transformative” if it serves a purpose or
function that is different from that of the original copyrighted
work. 134 For example, in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., the reproduction and inclusion of seven Grateful
129

See generally Netanel, supra note 127.
269 F.3d 1258, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001), reh’g denied, 275 F.3d 58 (11th Cir. 2001).
131
Id. at 1277. The Second Circuit has been protective of authors’ copyrights. In
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), the court denied the claim of
“transformative,” noting that the novel was merely a sequel. In order for the book to be
a transformative work, something other than new expression has to be added. It had to
have been created for a different purpose, such as criticism or comment. In Warner
Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the Second
Circuit had to rule on whether the Harry Potter lexicon was infringing. The court held
that parts were transformative, but the extensive copying was not. All in all, it was
deemed to be an infringing work.
132
See 137 F.3d 109, 137 (2d Cir. 1998).
133
See 353 F.3d 792, 800–03 (9th Cir. 2003).
134
See id. at 800–01.
130
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Dead concert posters in a book about the band titled Illustrated
Trip was held to be “transformative” because of both the
differences in size and purpose of the graphics.135 The purpose of
the defendant’s use was to help to illustrate and document the
progression of concerts that took place during the book’s timeline,
while the purpose and character of the use of the original posters
themselves was “artistic expression and promotion.”136 The use
of the posters was held to be fair.137
Recently, in Blanch v. Koons, the artist, Jeff Koons’ use of an
altered advertising photograph was held to be sufficiently
“transformative,” and therefore fair. 138 The plaintiff, a fashion
photographer, had produced the photograph at issue in the case,
Silk Sandals by Gucci, for a display advertisement in Allure
magazine, a lifestyle magazine, as part of an article about “metallic
makeup.”139 Koons on the other hand had included a portion of
the photograph, along with other material and other fashion shots,
in his mural titled, “Niagara,” which was for the Berlin
Guggenheim Museum.140 The court cited Bill Graham Archives
and stated, “[w]hen, as here, the copyrighted work is used as ‘raw
material’ in furtherance of a distinct creative or communicative
objectives, the use is transformative.”141 The Blanch photograph
and Koons’ use had “entirely different purpose and meaning.”142
C. Verbatim Copying: The Next Frontier
In recent cases—many involving verbatim copying put to
another purpose—the courts have been exceedingly pro-fair use.143
In dealing with the Internet, the courts have been even more profair use.144 In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,145 the plaintiff was a
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

See 448 F.3d 605 at 611–12 (9th Cir. 2006).
See id. at 609.
See id. at 615.
See 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id. at 247–48.
See id. at 248.
See id. at 253 (citation omitted).
Id.
See cases cited infra Parts IV.C, IV.D.
336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
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professional photographer whose primary market was
photographic images of the American West.146 He sued a search
engine, ArribaSoft for copyright infringement for displaying
reproductions of photographs from his website as small
“thumbnails” in its image search results.147 The court held that
the display of the thumbnail images was transformative and
therefore “fair use” because it primarily served a purpose other
than that of the original photographs. 148 The use of the
copyrighted images by the search engine functioned primarily as a
utilitarian tool to locate and facilitate easier access to images on
Internet websites, not as a medium for displaying photographs.149
There was, therefore, no overlap or substitution in the
marketplace.150 The same result was found in Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon, Inc.151 The Ninth Circuit held that the transformativeness
of the use—finding material on the original web pages 152 —was
more important than the normal market use, which was the
uploading of “adult photographs” onto cellular telephones.153 If
the use is transformative, the fourth factor is less important.154
In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C.,155 the Fourth
Circuit held that even verbatim copying may be a fair use if the use
is for a different purpose than the original.156 iParadigms runs a
service, Turnitin, that can check students’ research papers for
plagiarism. 157 Schools that subscribed to the service would
require their students “to upload the students’ term papers onto the
Turnitin website.”158 Turnitin would then compare the students’
papers with its electronic database of published articles and

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

See id. at 815.
See id.
See id. at 819.
See id.
See id. at 821.
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
See id. at 1165.
See id. at 1166.
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 639.
See id. at 634.
Netanel, supra note 127, at 764.
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previously uploaded papers for plagiarism.159 A group of students
sued the service for copyright infringement.160
The court found that the use was a fair use, mainly because it
was transformative.161 The use was to prevent plagiarism.162 That
was a totally different purpose from the purpose that the students
wrote the papers in the first place.163 The court noted that a use
may be transformative without adding anything to it, if it is used
for a different purpose than the original. 164 The Fourth Circuit
also noted the third factor does not count against fair use if it was
reasonably necessary for the transformative use to copy the
underlying work in its entirety.165
D. Educational Fair Use
There are two cases that were decided in 2012 that have
expanded fair use in the educational context a great deal—
Cambridge University Press v. Becker166 and Authors Guild, Inc.
v. HathiTrust. 167 In Cambridge University Press v. Becker,
Georgia State University was sued for digitizing chapters of books
and journal articles without authorization and putting them on
reserve in the library for the students’ use.168 The case is long,
and goes over the analysis underlying book by underlying book, so
we will only summarize it here. The case does have several
interesting holdings for our purposes.
The first is that the court distinguished Kinkos169 and Michigan
Document Services,170 cases in which copying of academic course
159

See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.
2009).
160
See id. at 635.
161
See id. at 640.
162
Id.
163
See id.
164
See id. at 639.
165
See id. at 642.
166
863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
167
902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
168
See Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
169
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
170
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (Texaco was not a
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packs was held to be infringement, by stating that those cases
involved for-profit enterprises. 171 Georgia State University, in
contrast, is a non-profit educational institution, and therefore is
different. 172 The next holding deals with de minimis copying.
The court held that even though a work had been digitized,
uploaded, and downloaded by the professor and the library staff, if
not enough students had downloaded the article, it was de minimis,
and did not infringe. 173 This is an interesting take on the de
minimis doctrine. Regarding the second factor, the nature of the
work, the Northern District of Georgia held that all of the works
were informational, because they were used for classroom
instruction, regardless of their actual content.174
Regarding the third factor, the court came up with its own
standard and interesting determination as to what work constitutes
the original work for purposes of the fair-use analysis, which looks
suspiciously like a “bright line” test, that courts are not supposed to
adopt. 175 It is also counterintuitive in its logic. If a book or
journal has ten chapters or fewer, up to 10% of the book may be
taken.176 If a book, however, has eleven chapters or greater, then
only one chapter may be taken.177 For the issue of market harm,
this was counterintuitive, also. If the plaintiff had decided to
license the work at issue, then to not pay the license fee favored the
plaintiff. If, however, the plaintiff did not have a market
established for digital licensing, or if the plaintiff had decided not
to license the book chapter-by-chapter, then to not pay favored the
case with course packs, but isolated copies of journal articles. The court found the use to
not be a fair use based largely on the for-profit nature of the commercial enterprise.).
171
See Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
172
See id.
173
See id. at 1238–39, 1245.
174
See id. at 1242.
175
“Fair Use” is supposed to be handled on a case-by-case, or ad hoc, basis without any
definite amount of the work that is considered to be unfair. The fact that the court is
using a definite percentage of the copyrighted work to determine the third factor of fair
use is highly unusual. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)
(The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 531, 560 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
176
Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d. at 1243.
177
Id.
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defendant. In many of the cases, it was a fair use to simply not
pay because the plaintiff did not have an established market in the
digital work or had decided not to license it.
Many of the books or journals at issue were knocked out
because of technical standing or contract issues, or because the
plaintiffs could not prove originality.178 All in all, only five out of
74 excerpts at issue infringed. 179 Cambridge University Press
could have implications for third-party unlicensed use of excerpts
of the works.
A more important case is Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust180,
for it contains a holding that could have profound importance all of
the mass digitization cases. In HathiTrust, several universities
made an arrangement with Google to digitize their entire
libraries. 181 As per the arrangement, after digitization, Google
retained a copy of the digital book to be available through Google
Books, an online system that allows Google users to search the
content and view “snippets” of the books:182
Google also provide[d] a digital copy of each
scanned work to the Universities, which included
scanned image files of the pages and a text file from
the printed work . . . . After Google provide[d] the
Universities with digital copies of their [library
holdings], the Universities then “contribute[d]”
these digital copies to the HathiTrust Digital
Library (“HDL”).183
The HathiTrust partnership is in the process of creating “a
shared digital repository that already contains almost 10 million

178

See generally Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga.
2012) (discussing throughout the opinion how several of the alleged fringed material that
not meet the originality requirement).
179
See id. at 1363–64.
180
902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
181
Id. at 448.
182
See id.
183
Id.

2014]

ISSUES AND BEST PRACTICES ON THE "CLOUD"

661

digital volumes.” 184 The Authors Guild sued HathiTrust and
several university personnel.185
The court, on summary judgment, ruled that the uses to which
the books were put was transformative and, therefore, fair use.186
A transformative use may be one that actually
changes the original work. However, a
transformative use can also be one that serves an
entirely different purpose . . . The use to which the
works in the HDL are put is transformative because
the copies serve an entirely different purpose than
the original works: the purpose is superior search
capabilities rather than actual access to copyrighted
material. The search capabilities of the HDL have
already given rise to new methods of academic
inquiry such as text mining.187
The court also held that
The use of digital copies to facilitate access for
print-disabled persons is also transformative. Printdisabled individuals are not considered to be a
significant market or potential market to publishers
and authors. As a result, the provision of access for
them was not the intended use of the original work
(enjoyment and use by sighted persons) and this use
is transformative.188
Fair use is a perplexing and changing doctrine, often left to the
judges themselves to fashion. There is, however, a trend toward
transformative use that has been growing over the years. The
recent case, HathiTrust, in which the digitization of entire libraries
was considered to be transformative because digital versions, or
computerized versions, have “text searching” ability is a new and
major expansion of the doctrine. It is buttressed by the holding
184

Id.
See id. at 448 (“Google’s use of the digital works is the subject of a separate
lawsuit.”).
186
See id. at 460.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 461.
185
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that providing access to the “sight disabled” is a fair use, as well.189
As it continues to evolve and expand, particularly in the
educational-use context, the concept of transformative use may
have important implications for the OER movement by providing a
robust fair-use defense in support of the creation and widespread
distribution of teaching, learning, and research resources designed
to increase educational opportunity and development on a global
scale through greater access and relevance.
V. MORAL RIGHTS OR LE DROIT MORAL
Moral Rights or Le Droit Moral190 is originally a Continental
European doctrine that respects the personal rights, along with the
property rights,191 that are attached to a work of art or literature.
Moral Rights legislation is found in Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.192
After initially rejecting all moral rights legislation, a compromise
regarding moral rights led to the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
and permitted the United States to become a member of the Berne
Convention in 1988, effective March 1, 1989.193 As of September
189

See also Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(decided largely on the same grounds as the Hathitrust case). It is interesting that the
author of the opinion, Judge Chin, was the exact same judge who did not accept the
proposed settlement in the case in 2011 because it was “not fair, adequate, and
reasonable.” Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). Two years later, he ruled against the plaintiffs, giving them nothing at all.
190
Technically called Les Droits Moraux, it has been singularized to Le Droit Moral
and will be used in the singular in this Article.
191
Copyright is considered a property right; moral rights, such as the right of attribution
(paternity) and the right of integrity, are personal rights. See, e.g., Understanding
Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/
intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
192
See The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, revised and amended through Sept. 28, 1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 828
U.N.T.S. I-11850, [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention is an
international agreement governing copyright, which was first accepted in Berne,
Switzerland, in 1886. It has been amended and joined by additional nations at various
times.
193
The United States initially refused to become a party to the Convention, since that
would have required major changes in its Copyright law, particularly with regard to
moral rights, removal of the general requirement for registration of copyright works, and
elimination of mandatory copyright notice. See, e.g., William Patry, The United States
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2013, there are 167 contracting parties to the Berne Convention.194
The Berne Convention provides reciprocal copyright protection for
its members, and once a work is protected in one country, it is
afforded protection in all.195
The major moral rights are (1) the right of attribution
(paternity), and (2) the right of integrity, which allows an artist or
author to object to modifications, alterations, or mutilations that
are prejudicial to his or her honor. 196 The Berne Convention
requires that the moral rights be independent of the author’s
economic rights.197 Moral rights are only accorded to individual
authors, not to owners through assignment, license, or transfer.198
Moral rights may be waived in some countries.199
In the United States, since 2003, false attribution claims have
not been actionable under the Lanham Act owing to Dastar Corp.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.200 In Dastar, the Supreme
Court held that the Lanham Act 201 does not prevent the
unaccredited copying of a work, and held that Dastar was free to
commercialize and distribute a video that it had copied and edited

and International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 750–52
(2003).
194
Contracting Parties: Berne Convention, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
195
See Berne Convention, supra note 192, art. 5.
196
There are actually five different rights that are included in Moral Rights: (1) the
right to create or not to create, (2) the right of respect (the right to determine
completeness of a project), (3) the right to disclose, or to withdraw from display, (4) the
right of attribution (paternity), and (5) the right of integrity (the right to prevent
modifications, distortions, or mutilations that are prejudicial to one’s reputation). See
LEONARD D. DUBOFF, SHERRI BURR & MICHAEL MURRAY, ART LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 167–82 (rev. ed. 2010).
197
See Berne Convention, supra note 192, art. 6bis.
198
See Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int
/freepublications/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
199
See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the
Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 244–45 (1995).
200
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). For a
thorough discussion of the Dastar decision and its ramifications, see Michael Landau,
Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights
in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273 (2005).
201
The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127).
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and that was originally made by Fox.202 The Supreme Court held
that “as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in
our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated
the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such
an extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of
accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and
inconsistent with precedent.”203 The court stated that “allowing a
cause of action under § 43(a) . . . would create a species of mutant
copyright law that limits the public’s federal right to ‘copy and to
use’ expired copyrights.”204 While the motion picture/video was
in the public domain because it was not renewed, the opinion is not
so narrow as to apply to only public domain works.205 It has been
followed in cases in which the copyright has expired and in cases
in which the copyright is in full force.206
In the cases that have followed Dastar, claims for an
attribution right in both copyrighted and public domain works did
not make it past a motion to dismiss.207 It is therefore unlikely
that any author who was listed on a changed work, or not listed on
his/her own work, would have an action under the Lanham Act for
attribution. It should be noted that the right of attribution is not
one of the bundle of rights that is listed in Section 106 of the

202

See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37–38.
Id. at 32.
204
Id. at 34. Justice Scalia was seemingly confusing the purposes of copyright and
trademark law. Copyright law governs the use of the work; trademark law insures that
customers are not confused by requiring truthful labeling of and statements about the
goods and services.
205
See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (holding that Dastar applies to copyrighted works as well as public domain works).
206
See, e.g., Chivalry Film Prods. v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 05-CV-5627 (GEL),
2006 WL 89944, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006) (misattributed screenplay); A Slice of
Pie Prods. L.L.C. v. Wayans Bros. Entm’t, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297, 312–14 (D. Conn. 2005)
(misattributed screenplay); Mays v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370–71 (D. Md. 2005)
(no claim for lack of attribution for a web design portfolio); Keane v. Fox, 297 F. Supp.
2d 921, 934–36 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (claim dismissed against person who allegedly
developed the idea for “American Idol”); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (misattributed narration script and editing work).
207
See JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KELVIN, TRADEMARK AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 668 (4th ed. 2007).
203
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Copyright Act of 1976. 208 Therefore, it is doubtful that an
attribution action would stand under the Copyright Act.
Regarding the right of integrity, in the United States, with the
exception of “works of visual art,”209 the right of integrity is based
on whether the license contains the right to prepare a derivative
work 210 or its equivalent, and is solely handled by contract (or
license).211 To the extent many, if not all, works in a repository
are licensed under a Creative Commons license that allows
“Adaptations,” the author probably would have given away any
right to object to changes.212 Care, though, must be taken to take
208

Exclusive rights in copyrighted works:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
209
Id. § 101 (definition of “work of visual art”).
210
See Id. § 106(2).
211
See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Unauthorized derivative work was prepared. The BBC, the original licensor, had only
licensed the rights to broadcast and to sublicense the work, therefore ABC did not have
the right to cut 27% out of the show without permission.); see also Vargas v. Esquire,
Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 1947) (Contract transferred all rights to Esquire
Magazine. There was no violation of a right of attribution or integrity when Esquire
published drawings as “Esquire Girls” without attributing the artist, Alberto Vargas).
212
“Adaptations” is another way of saying “derivative works.” Section 101 defines
“derivative works” as follows:
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
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a look at which license was used to see whether any potential
changes may be made to a licensed work. A requirement by the
repository for end users of OER materials to post or publish only
under a Creative Commons license may mitigate risks associated
with derivative works and any right of integrity.
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)213 is an artpreservation act that applies to a minimum class of specified works
called “works of visual art” in the Copyright Act. It only applies
to original works of visual art, and does not apply to motion
pictures or audiovisual works, reproductions of works, or works
made for hire. As such, it is doubtful that there would be any
VARA-defined work included in a repository.

editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications,
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
“derivative work”.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
213
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A. The Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 (VARA) is really an art preservation act, instead of an act that truly gives
attribution and integrity rights to authors. This is because of the very limited coverage
of VARA. VARA only applies to works of visual art and defines a “work of visual art”
as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy,
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture,
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or
other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
It does not include:
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book,
magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information
service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional,
descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
Id.
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The ability to remix works in the OER forum opens an
opportunity for claims of moral rights outside the United States
and claims in the nature of moral rights within the United States.214
Notice provisions and disclaimers indicating that a work has been
altered without the express approval of the creator may be useful to
mitigate against this risk. Additionally, implementation of a
technical application or feature designed to track, record, and show
edits by contributor may further mitigate integrity risk. This
application may be available through the Creative Commons
license or provided locally by the repository or at the cloud level as
part of the provider’s hosting package. At least within the United
States, the repository’s terms of use should include an express
waiver from the creator when possible to help mitigate risk of a
claim of or in the nature of moral rights.
VI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In the United States, state universities are protected by the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution.215 Under sovereign
immunity, a state is absolutely immune from monetary damages
for infringement of intellectual property, unless it consents to suit
or waives its immunity.216 Since the late 1990s, case after case
did not make it past a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity
grounds.217
214

See, e.g., GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 5.03
(3rd ed. 2013).
215
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution trumps any attempt under Article I of the
Constitution to abrogate sovereign immunity); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank (Florida Prepaid I), 527 U.S. 627, 635–48 (1999)
(holding that any patent law abrogation was unconstitutional, and that there was no
Fourteenth Amendment taking); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. (Florida Prepaid II), 527 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1999) (holding that any
trademark law abrogation was unconstitutional, and that there was no property interest in
freedom from false advertising); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607–08
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that any copyright law abrogation was unconstitutional).
216
See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 54.
217
See, e.g., Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F.
Supp. 2d. 1088, 1098–99 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp.
2d 352, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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There is an exception to the general rule of sovereign
immunity. Under Ex Parte Young, an action for prospective
injunctive relief may be brought against state officials or
employees acting in their official capacity.218 In order to bring the
suit, however, the cause of action must be brought against the
officials in their named capacity, not the university. 219 An
example of this is the lawsuit against Georgia State University,
Cambridge University Press v. Becker.220 The suit was brought
against the President, Provost, Librarian, and others who worked at
the university—not directly against the university.221 Again, the
most that can happen is that the university will have to stop future
infringements. 222 There cannot be monetary liability for past
infringement, no matter how egregious the infringement.223 There
can, however, be a discretionary award of attorneys’ fees to the
“prevailing party.”224
Sovereign immunity has been a doctrine in flux over the years.
The cases that firmly established state sovereign immunity were
decided by a split Supreme Court. 225 The legal landscape may
change at some time, but for now, state universities have the
advantage of sovereign immunity being on their side. State
repositories accustomed to the protection afforded by sovereign
immunity may be reluctant to assume liability in the form of
indemnification to the cloud provider and may, in fact, be limited
by state law from doing so.226 A complete analysis of how the
doctrine of sovereign immunity may inform the risk allocation
218

209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908).
See Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1205–10 (N.D.
Ga. 2012)
220
See id.
221
See id. at 1201.
222
See id. at 1215 (describing Ex Parte Young as providing for injunctive and
declaratory relief).
223
See id. at 1206 (framing Ex Parte Young as only permitting prospective injunctive
relief against continuing violations).
224
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
225
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Florida Prepaid
II, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
226
See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 250 (2003)
(finding that Georgia law did not permit municipalities to waive sovereign immunity and
indemnify third parties).
219
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between a state repository and cloud provider is beyond the scope
of this Article, but should be considered when applicable.
CONCLUSION
In furtherance of the OER movement and global education
generally, the importance of a cloud strategy extends beyond cost
savings and computing performance optimization for current
business needs.
The cloud can enable new services for
repositories and end users that can facilitate innovation and
creativity in education. Digital, social, and mobile media are
fundamentally changing business models across industries as they
transform communication and create new business opportunities,
which may extend to education. By placing OER materials in the
cloud under a Creative Commons license that permits full remix
rights, institutions will enable a new kind of global learning and
collaboration.
Educational institutions and repositories can
leverage emerging mobile and collaborative computing trends to
extend resources and new services to students and faculty with
fewer geographic-based limitations. The cloud represents a
critical component of this business innovation. Additionally, the
detailed usage and analytical information available through the
cloud metering model will provide a new level of transparency
around operations that may reveal opportunities to revise internal
management and processes to drive further operational business
efficiencies through a best practices approach.
It should be noted that cloud solutions are not an all-or-nothing
proposition. It is possible that in considering the risk allocation
and other issues, the institution may conclude that a hybrid data
center model is appropriate, moving certain content to the cloud
and retaining other content on its servers, yet providing a seamless
experience to its end users through APIs and portals. A
comprehensive analysis of alternatives should include separate
assessments of the key business features and requirements, such as
quality control, security, availability and performance, associated
with the each component of the repository, to determine the
optimal solution for each type of functionality. Generally
speaking, functionality that demands greater control for any
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number of legitimate business reasons, such as heightened security
concerns, strong identification with the institution, or dynamic
feature requirements, may not be appropriate for the public cloud.
A thoughtful plan can manage the cloud-related business
challenges on an individual component basis in order to meet
acceptable enterprise risk tolerance levels and move forward to
meet business needs without significant capital expenditure on
hardware, software, and services.
Finally, it is important to understand the scope of risk and
differentiate between real and perceived risks. Many risks and
vulnerabilities are not isolated to the cloud but also exist to some
extent in traditional systems, including proprietary university
systems. Further, some of these risks may be managed more
efficiently in the cloud. For example, while it is true that the
complexity of security is increased under circumstances of widely
dispersed data, cloud providers have sufficient scale and
motivation to adopt and deploy more sophisticated security
protections and they may be contractually required to do so.
Similarly, concerns surrounding performance and availability
issues are not new or unique to the cloud. Service-level
agreements may be included in contractual arrangements to hold
the cloud provider to mutually agreed performance requirements
that meet or exceed service levels available through a proprietary
server system. Indeed, many cloud-related issues and risks
associated with the necessary loss of control to the institution may
be effectively addressed and allocated through carefully considered
contractual provisions.
With respect to a contractual relationship whereby the
repository owner desires to outsource all or a portion of the
repository to a cloud provider on a true OER platform, allowing
open access and full remixing opportunity, it seems relatively easy
to determine what each party brings to the table. The institution
brings content and the cloud provider contributes a technology
platform. There are infringement risks associated with both the
content and technology and risk allocation should address both.
Although many of the content-risk cases discussed above address
state claims in the nature of defamation, we recognize the
existence of content-related risk associated with other types of
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offensive and/or illegal speech, including obscenity, indecent
materials, and content that could result in or further illegal acts.
Thoughtful terms and policies should be posted on the sites to
proactively restrict the posting of content deemed to be particularly
risky or contrary to law, and a process should be put in place to
enforce those terms and policies as necessary. Use of technical
tools to restrict access to or availability of certain types of high risk
content may be helpful.227
Finally, a significant aspect of any strategic plan to transition
operations to the cloud should include an internal and external
communication and education plan to overcome perceptions of
increased risk and effectively manage actual risk.
Also,
significant thought should be devoted to front-end operations by
the institution responsible for the repository. This includes
effective notice and disclaimer provisions on the site, thoughtful
terms of use and privacy policies, limitations as to who may
publish works and under what terms (for example, Creative
Commons228), and other quality control mechanisms. While open
systems may facilitate greater volume, there is also greater risk of
content-based liability. Further, if additional volume does not serve
the business purpose of the repository, it may create unnecessary
and unwanted risk. Front-end quality-type controls may be one
the best ways to mitigate downstream risk. Of course, there
should also be a carefully negotiated commercial arrangement with
the cloud provider to allocate risk in line with each party’s
respective contributions and economic opportunities. In a typical
arrangement involving the provision of cloud services for a fee, the
repository owner should assume overall DMCA compliance
responsibility and agree to post DMCA notice and takedown
procedures clearly and conspicuously on its site. This should be
reinforced by the cloud provider’s agreement to post a clear and
conspicuous notice on the appropriate page of its site highlighting
the repository’s process and the cloud provider’s contractual
227

As with potential DMCA limits in circumstances of willful blindness, reason would
suggest that there may be similar limits under the CDA in connection with knowing and
egregious risk to national security.
228
At the time of this writing, Creative Commons is seeking comments on version 4 of
the Creative Commons licenses, so we expect the new versions to be available and
recommended for use in the near term.
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obligation to promptly forward any misdirected notices to the
repository. Should the cloud provider provide the hosting services
in a co-branded environment, receive additional benefits through
the hosting relationship, or contribute to the resources, the risk
allocation should be adjusted to reflect the economics as well as
the possibility of new risk.

